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Science, medicine, technology. These activities conjure up various 
images today for the careful observer and student of American culture. In 
multiple ways these activities appear relevant, even crucial, to contempo-
rary life. To many Americans in our own time they seem related to society 
and culture as problem and solution, as threats to the social fabric and 
therapy for it. Because members of the American Studies movement often 
do take a sharp interest in contemporary society and culture, it might be 
expected that scholars in American Studies would have investigated them 
in considerable depth. 
Such has not been the case. It is odd but incontestable that science, 
medicine and technology -in American culture, as objects of study, have 
been, at best, of marginal concern to American Studies scholars and stu-
dents. There has been some interest in the field, to be sure, but almost 
always among historians, not American Studies scholars. American 
Quarterly, American Studies or other journals in the field of American 
Studies have occasionally carried articles on these subjects. Usually the 
authors of these single studies were budding specialists in the history of 
science, not in American Studies, who published their work and then 
returned to their home turf. Occasionally scholars bridged the gap between 
the study of science, technology and medicine in America and American 
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culture with books, including such distinguished scholars as Merle Curti 
and Stow Persons.1 Such work did not generate a school of American 
Studies scholars studying science, medicine and technology in American 
culture. Nor has there been much intellectual cross fertilization between 
historians of science and American Studies scholars on these topics. This 
seems a peculiar state of affairs. Why have these two great wings of 
American culture studies—science and literature—not taken much interest 
in one another? 
Models for such study and cooperation do exist. Two schools of 
thought emerged by the mid-1960s. In his The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions (1962) Thomas S. Kuhn, a philosopher and historian of science, 
outlined a program for cultural historical studies that revived both Neo-
Kantian and Hegelian philosophical idealism in more respectable, or, at 
least, more up-to-date costume, and, in turn, amplified the post World War 
II idealist program led by Alexandre Koyre and others in philosophy and 
history of science.2 Kuhn argued that the scientific community's investi-
gatory and interpretive efforts were directly influenced by shared, often 
tacit, paradigms or models of nature. Through various means of socializa-
tion—commonly, education and apprenticeship—the established practitio-
ners incorporated the younger generation of scientists into the community. 
In such ways was the communal paradigm passed on to succeeding gen-
erations. Most scientists spent their careers working out the puzzles of the 
paradigm, taking the discrete facts with which they worked and fitting 
them into the larger paradigm at the appropriate points. 
Because science in past and present are never the same, Kuhn had to 
account for changes in science's history. He explained the dynamics of 
change from one "paradigm" to another as internal—thus change stemmed 
from actions within the community of investigators. Specifically there 
came a point at which the discovery of new facts as anomalies with the 
old shared paradigm created such a burden of conflict and stress that a 
revolution took place in the perceptions of the research community's 
investigators, and, in short order, the community created a new paradigm 
in which the new and old facts could be comfortably juxtaposed and 
reconciled with one another. Thus there was "progress" through scientific 
revolutions. 
What Kuhn offered was a program in which the ideas of science 
remained crucial and important. And for those interested in the social 
history of ideas, or the sociology of knowledge, his work appeared fresh 
and exciting. He stressed the importance of the scientific community as the 
social medium in which the actions of scientists took place, and as the 
mechanism (or congeries of mechanisms) through which the "progress" of 
science took place. This seemed ample grist for the mills of historians, 
social scientists and even specialists in American Studies. Moreover Kuhn 
appeared to make the history of science more accessible to non-scientists, 
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specifically to those trained in the humanities and social sciences, by 
insisting that the internal dynamics of a social entity—the scientific 
community—was the locus of science's history. 
The other school of thought was even more accessible to historians and 
American Studies specialists than that which Kuhn represented. It might be 
thought of as the moralistic or even metaphysical school of the history of 
technology, a congenial enough perspective for many humanists and social 
scientists. Its most articulate champion was if, anything, better known to 
American Studies scholars than Kuhn—Leo Marx. His The Machine in 
the Garden. Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (1964) offered 
a work that was far more accessible to American Studies scholars than 
science and its history. Marx's book rapidly became a classic in American 
Studies, one of several other such seminal works in his field, beginning 
with Henry Nash Smith's Virgin Land (1950), and including R.W.B. 
Lewis' The American Adam (1955), John William Ward's Andrew Jackson. 
Symbol for an Age (1955), and Marvin Meyers' The Jacksonian Persua-
sion (1957) that were known under the rubric of the "myth and symbol" 
school. 
Those who worked in this vein used literary and historical materials 
(with emphasis on the literary) to "explain" various aspects of the essence 
of the American experience or of the national character, which was the 
result of that experience. Thus these scholars took an "essentialist" ap-
proach to American culture: the essence of America, past and present, was 
this or that main theme or issue or that, such as the economic or frontier 
interpretations of American history as offered up by Charles A. Beard and 
Frederick Jackson Turner. For those of the myth and symbol school, the 
tension between nature and civilization spelled the essence of the Ameri-
can experience. As for their approaches and interpretations, the school's 
guru, Henry Nash Smith, explained that myth and symbol stood for larger 
or smaller units of the "same kind of thing, namely an intellectual con-
struction that fused concept and emotion into an image"; thus myths and 
symbols were collective representations, "not the work of a single mind."3 
Marx focused on what he dubbed the pastoral ideal in America, and its 
concomitant dichotomy of nature versus civilization, as the essence or 
central meaning of America, past and present—a Hegelian dialectic if there 
ever was one. The "pastoral ideal" had been used from the age of discov-
ery to the present century to define the meaning of America. Europeans 
were dazzled by the possibilities of a fresh, new, virgin world that the 
New World offered—including those of withdrawal from the troubled and 
problematic Old World. 
Marx interpreted the pastoral ideal as the central cultural symbol of 
American culture past and present as it changed from Shakespeare's Tem-
pest to F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby. Its chief manifestation was 
what he called the machine in the garden. The machine stood for indus-
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trialization; the garden represented bucolic or pastoral America. The 
machine in the garden signified the invasion of technology and industrial-
ism into pastoral America. "When the Republic was founded, nine of ten 
Americans were husbandmen," Marx argued, whereas "today not one in 
ten lives on a farm. Ours is an intricately organized, urban, industrial, 
nuclear-armed society." The essence of the American experience was the 
pastoral ideal. Marx devoted considerable space to the years 1800 to 1860 
when, he insisted, many Americans were torn over the intrusion of the 
machine into the garden, and when many seemed to believe that, despite 
this potential contradiction, all would be well, for the upshot would be 
what Marx labelled a "middle landscape," in which the pastoral fused with 
industrialism in new and presumably beneficial ways, what one of his 
students had called "workshops in the wilderness."4 Hence the early 
American linking of good land and honest labor could now include virtu-
ous manufacturing and commerce as well. Yet Marx insisted that this soon 
changed. After 1860 the "middle landscape" idea became increasingly 
unrealistic. The dream of "a rural nation exhibiting a happy balance of art 
and nature" became chimerical, a mere rhetorical bromide rather than a 
social blueprint, "an increasingly transparent and jejune expression of the 
national preference for having it both ways," thus enabling the nation to 
continue to define its purpose "as the pursuit of rural happiness while 
devoting itself to productivity, wealth, and power."5 
Marx wrote about technology in society and culture in a new fashion. 
At least since the 1920s scholars, writers and commentators in America 
had viewed technology (and, by implication, medicine and science) as a 
positive social force that influenced society and culture profoundly. This 
was part of perceiving technology—and science and medicine too—as 
solutions to social problems. What Marx injected into American Studies 
discourse was the post-1950s notion of technology as morally good or bad 
(in his own determination as bad), or technology as social problem as well 
as social solution.6 In this way did he champion the labelling of tech-
nology as autonomous force from a moralistic—as well as a metaphysical 
or essentialist—perspective. 
Initially Kuhn and Marx attracted much attention, and in certain ways 
they still do. Yet perhaps ironically, relatively little scholarly or mono-
graphic work has flowed or derived from theirs, so that these are schools 
without disciples, at least in a direct sense. For many in the history of 
science and cultural history in the 1960s, Kuhn's insistence that ideas 
could be linked with communities seemed to suggest a resolution to the 
"internal" versus "external" or ideas versus social experience debates that 
raged then. This was enormously stimulating as a general guide and stimu-
lated discourse, but it remained only a suggestion. To paraphrase Kuhn, he 
did not create a paradigm which others could use as the basis for further 
practice. The problems were multiple and nettlesome. What was a para-
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digm? Was it a micro-statement, a statement organizing material at some 
middle level of consciousness (or a variety thereof) or was it the model of 
the world? Were there important paradigms that were not statements about 
nature? And there seemed to be a pre-paradigmatic phase in the history of 
science, before there were universal paradigms. Could it really be estab-
lished that there was something called "pre-science," and then after a 
certain point in history, "science"? Clearly that was a scientist's perspec-
tive, but how could a historian or social scientist legitimately shape it into 
a useful research agenda? And, for that matter, how could such a perspec-
tive be used in other areas of cultural history studies? Thus how could it 
be applied to politics and political theory, literature and drama, social 
thought and public policy or other non-scientific activities? Were there 
pre-paradigmatic periods of literature and politics, for example? Or was 
this just another form of presentist whiggery, modernization theory or other 
simple-minded linear explanations? And what did this say about Kuhn's 
notions of science? 
Nor was this all. Kuhn gave great authority to the notion, not original 
with him or his work, that there were "internal" and "external" factors in 
the development of science, meaning, quite internal and external in relation 
to the scientific community itself. This also encouraged thinking of them 
as dichotomous, clearly not helpful if one wished to mediate these angles 
of vision as had seemed possible with Kuhn's work initially. Despite some 
overtures to the contrary, as when he discussed how "paradigm shifts" and 
"revolutions" occurred, at bottom he thought of science as progressive, 
additive and cumulative. Humans might be fallible, but the knowledge of 
science was somehow not, or, at least, less so. He did not take up the 
platonic argument that knowledge existed independently of human history, 
but on closer examination he might as well have insofar as his potential 
influence among those trained in the humanities and social sciences was 
concerned. Hence Kuhn's ultimate effect among American Studies scholars 
was not to encourage the study of medicine, science and technology, at 
least if by encourage one means direct inspiration and discipleship. It was 
true that some American Studies scholars did pick up on the notion of 
cultural paradigms, most notably the late Gene Wise, but its harvest in 
American Studies for any kind of scholarly investigations seemed slim 
pickings indeed. In addition, that was the result in the history of science 
as well.7 This is not to say that Kuhn had no generalized influence 
among historians of science, or, for that matter, among a wide variety of 
scholars interested in cultural studies. He did and does. But, to paraphrase 
Kuhn, his work was non-paradigmatic: it could not be used as the basis of 
further practice. 
The legacy of Marx's work has been complex in a different way. 
Among American Studies scholars, his approaches to historical and literary 
sources have remained popular, especially for undergraduate teaching. It is 
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perhaps revealing, however, that scholars in the field eschew the particular 
myth and symbol approach as method. In 1972, Bruce Kuklick published 
what became a famous methodological critique of the myth and symbol 
school in which he accused its members—including Marx—of a variety of 
serious errors that compromised their scholarship and interpretations, errors 
including what amounted to reading back into ancient sources the concerns 
of modern intellectuals through a confused Cartesian dualistic approach to 
the history of ideas, and to errors in assuming that one could read from 
popular culture to the motives and ideas of members of an entire society.8 
Kuklick did not criticize the larger aspects of Marx's work concerning 
technology and American culture; however, such would not have been his 
intention. 
From a historian's point of view, Marx's work constituted a metaphysi-
cal and moralistic critique that closed off scholarly discussion. And in that 
specific sense Marx's legacy differed sharply from Kuhn's. And unlike 
Kuhn, the scientist-insider, Marx viewed technology from the outside, as a 
self-professed "humanist" and not too subtle metaphysician and moralist. 
Technology was simply this large force, monolithic, all-powerful and bad. 
Once it intruded into the garden that he claims America was, it was all 
over. To put Marx's argument negatively, as it were, technology was not 
a multifaceted human activity in which human beings were involved and 
participated. 
Thus it was simply impossible to historicize Marx's argument. By 
insisting that the minute industrialism came, Americans could never have 
their rural past again, and that the unfolding future was both ineluctable 
and bad, Marx helped articulate a particular research agenda for the inves-
tigation of the relations between technology and society and culture. It 
would stress the depiction of the impact of technology upon society in an 
obviously presentist program. As Marx would have it, the intrusion of the 
machine into the garden was the beginning of our own time. This was not 
a useful perspective for someone interested in the past for its own sake. 
Eventually several writers noticed, in the words of Howard P. Segal, that 
there was more than one "middle landscape," so that there were more 
possibilities in America's past than Marx had conceded.9 
Marx did not inspire derivative studies of technology and culture within 
the American Studies movement for various reasons. One consideration 
appears overriding: Marx's book simply closed off discussion. There was 
no way, outside of positing more "middle landscapes," that a scholar could 
follow up with more investigations if that person worked from within an 
American Studies perspective and with the kind of training commonly 
available in American Studies programs. The only avenue led to middle 
landscapes. But these seemed relatively limited in number and severely 
circumscribed in explanatory power. They were but brief stopping points 
on the ineluctable destination to the awful present In the hands of Marx 
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and his devotees, they were static, ahistorical categories—caricatures of the 
past, really—and could not serve as a useful guide to scholarly investiga-
tion and interpretation. 
By the middle to late 1970s the legacies of Kuhn and Marx seemed 
clear. In each case the imprint was a generalized one that helped set the 
tone for further speculation and conversation. By then a rising generation 
of historians interested in the history of science, medicine and technology 
in American culture was coming to the fore. In books and articles these 
scholars drew attention to the development of the scientific community in 
nineteenth-century America, or to the work of the medical and public 
health communities of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, to 
the influence, in America, of the ideas of such "great men" as Lamarck, 
Pasteur, Koch, Darwin and Freud, to the importance of the social processes 
of professionalization and certification, to the social relations of such fields 
as physics, the development and institutionalization of Darwinian theory, 
the development of medical education, the successes of the campaigns to 
stamp out impure foods and drugs and to fight terrifying diseases, the 
involvement of the federal government in science, and the like, among 
historians of American science and medicine. Here the generalized imprint 
of Kuhn was strong in the emphases on the communities and the ideas of 
science and medicine. As for Marx's influence on historians of American 
technology, there were, not surprisingly, virtually no studies based on his 
specific approach. But as historians of American technology published 
books and articles on technological institutions, the engineering profession, 
the development of space flight and aeronautics, the so-called "American 
system" of manufactures and the role of technology in warfare, industry 
and social life, the humanist perspective that Marx championed, in which 
technology was good or bad, often dominated the agenda of research and 
discussion, sometimes openly, as with David F. Noble's America by De-
sign (1977), in other instances not quite so obviously, as with Merritt Roe 
Smith's Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology. The Challenge 
of Change (1978).10 
Here we must recognize the popularity of the new social history, which 
has reordered research and teaching agendas in both history and American 
Studies. What began in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a call for a more 
quantitative (and, therefore, representative) approach to historical research 
in both research methods and conceptualizations of the relative "impor-
tance" or "relevance" of historical phenomena in the past—most commonly 
in political and economic history—became transformed by the late 1960s, 
aided doubtless by contemporary political crises, into the new social his-
tory, an interesting and new agenda for scholarship and for contemporary 
issues. The new social history had political as well as scholarly agendas 
and goals.11 
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What may not be so readily apparent is that the new social history of 
science and the new social history of America's groups (and thus the new 
American Studies scholarship) constituted parallel schools of thought. In 
turn they shared their origins in a chorus of concerns that were current in 
the 1950s: the belief in ineluctable social forces as well as the notion that 
the whole of American civilization had a distinct moral essence that could 
be judged. There appeared in the 1950s a language of protest against 
conformity and belonging and togetherness, as in the hip and beat move-
ments, that mushroomed into a full blown discourse of victimization in the 
1960s and 1970s, as in the popular moral movements for civil rights, 
feminism and against the Viet Nam War. In the new, post-1950s age, 
increasingly Americans from many walks of life acted and thought as if 
there was an infinity of dimensions, proportions, relations or, more simply, 
that life was individuated, that there was no larger whole, only an endless 
number of parts. Ours is an age in which we think of society as an 
aggregate of individuals—individual persons, single issues, an infinity of 
perspectives—and we cannot, try as we wish, regain that holistic sense of 
society that existed between the 1920s and the 1950s.12 The kind of think-
ing about the order of things in the world that began with William H. 
Why te Jr.'s famous study of organization men in the 1950s, with its witty, 
savage attacks on conformity and also David Riesman's The Lonely 
Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (New Haven, 1950) 
and even that quintessential 1950s motion picture, The Man in the Grey 
Flannel Suit, which first appeared as a bestselling novel by Wilson (New 
York, 1955), yielded first to forthright (and often highly moving) narra-
tives of white racist oppression of nonwhites, then to such calls as that of 
E.F. Schumacher for smaller-is-better, and onto the individualism of the 
1970s and 1980s, as in Tom Wolfe's designation of the "me-decade" for 
the former and "plutography" for the latter—among other representations.13 
For historians, this agenda has devolved into the social history of sci-
ence, technology and medicine, which has chiefly meant institutional, 
social and political history. Historians of American science, however, 
were also sensitive to the issues of race, gender and social oppression, so 
that there have been works on women and members of minority groups as 
their lives have been touched by science, medicine and technology, ranging 
from discrimination against women scientists to the eugenics movement or 
other manifestations of "scientific racism." For American Studies scholars 
the categories of race, gender and class have been crucial, as for the 
historians, but unlike the historians there seems to be relatively little inter-
est in the history of scientific institutions or the politics of science. The 
connecting thread is the assumption that the social matrix (or social 
matrices) order and control all human behavior and thought—all of society 
and culture.14 
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Given the assumption that the social matrix determines thought and 
action, then presumably investigations into the social history of science— 
and medicine and technology as well—would not appear to be "relevant" 
or "important" to American Studies scholars who were looking into the 
workings of a different part of the social matrix (or a different social 
matrix) pertaining to gender, or minority group status and history. This has 
indeed been the fate of American intellectual history, which used to be a 
broad field in which one attempted to understand important issues in the 
culture as a whole.15 From this point of view the field has become merely 
the social history of the intellectuals insofar as most specialists in it are 
concerned. And more is the pity. 
Ultimately the social history interpretation assumes different loci for 
different groups in the social matrix of the past, because of their differing 
"importance." Given the plebiscitary or "democratic" mentality about his-
torical "importance" rampant in many quarters in history and American 
Studies in our own time, a consequence of our individualistic way of 
understanding the world, of course such as science, medicine and technol-
ogy—those human activities which are done by elites and involve elabo-
rate and esoteric intellectual life—might appear marginal save in their 
social history, however defined. And it would be not so daunting for a 
scholar trained in the humanities or social sciences to take up such discus-
sions from a social history cum moralistic point of view. The technical or 
professional discourse of science, medicine or technology would be, for 
most, too forbidding. From this point of view, it would not make sense to 
regard science, medicine or technology as windows onto the past, no more 
or no less "important" than any other kind of coherent human activity in 
the past, even though that perspective might suggest how a historian or 
specialist in American Studies might penetrate the mysteries of scientific, 
medical and technological activities in American (or any) culture and 
society in the past. 
It would appear, to invoke William James, that like religious experi-
ences, there have been a variety of social history approaches in the history 
of American science, medicine and technology. One has been to write, in 
fairly straightforward fashion, about the history of scientific or medical or 
technological institutions or professionals in these fields. When this has 
been connected to the ideas of the dramatis personae, and even to the 
larger culture, the results have often been gratifying. Yet this is not a lead 
that has been followed much, especially in recent years. More common has 
been discussion of the social impact of science, technology or medicine— 
how these phenomena "impact upon" society, as with Stephen J. Gould's 
Mismeasure of a Man (1981), which insists that the inegalitarian ideas of 
scientists have led to the horrors of racism and sexism.16 Another vari-
ation has been to discuss social context as formative: what a scientist (or 
doctor or engineer) thinks is a reflection of who he or she is in society.17 
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The difficulty with such social history agendas—especially the latter two— 
is the problematic assumptions undergirding them. Thus it is simply not a 
self-evident truth that science (or medicine or technology) can be thought 
of as autonomous social forces beyond human control, after the fashion of 
Marx, or as ultimately "true" platonic statements as Kuhn would have it. 
Nor is it clear that one's social background is a predictable guide to their 
attitudes and behavior. It might be—and it often is not. 
In sum, a social history approach to cultural studies cannot provide the 
interpretive unity that is called for with increasing frequency in many 
scholarly circles. In a finely differentiated social matrix there can be no 
concept of unity save the social matrix itself, which in the hands of most 
scholars has been reified into a metaphysical unity, such as "industrialism" 
or "modernization" or the like. One cannot follow Marx if one's goal is 
true scholarship, for he has closed off discussion. In a curious kind of 
way, the result is the same with Kuhn. It is possible to have incessant 
discussion (as indeed has occurred in many academic circles) about Kuhn 
and his approach, but it is impossible to resolve any such discussions. In 
sum, Marx has closed off discussion before it can begin, and Kuhn has 
provided no guidance for participants to end discussion. 
There is another way of approaching the phenomena of science, medi-
cine and technology in American culture that might prove helpful for 
American Studies scholars—and, indeed, for any scholarly constituency. 
Those who have written from this point of view have stood the social 
history formulation on its head. They have asked what is the influence of 
American society and culture upon science, medicine and technology in 
America? How have common, widespread notions in culture and society 
in a given age influenced such complex and multifaceted phenomena as 
science, medicine and technology in the American past and present? 
There are several distinguished examples from the extant literature to 
point the way. In his classic The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary 
America (1956), Brooke Hindle covers a wide canvass of scientific activity 
in eighteenth-century America, and discussed men of science of widely 
differing backgrounds and interests. But he also demonstrates the intellec-
tual unity of the age, the essentially mercantile character of the scientific 
enterprise, a notion entirely congruent with those organizing the larger 
society and culture, and how that manifested itself in the scientific insti-
tutions of the age. He also convincingly narrates the establishment of the 
first home-grown scientific institutions in the Western Hemisphere during 
and after the Revolutionary War. Daniel J. Boorstin, in The Lost World of 
Thomas Jefferson (1948), and George H. Daniels, in American Science in 
the Age of Jackson (1967), well from this perspective cover their topics for 
the early to middle nineteenth century. Unfortunately the most noted works 
for the mid-nineteenth-century do not follow this promising lead, but for 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries there are other books in 
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this genre, including Henry D. Shapiro's Appalachia on our Mind (1978) 
which may be considered a landmark in both history and American Stud-
ies. Shapiro locates the causes and support for successive scientific ideas 
about Appalachia and its denizens in contemporary cultural notions about 
America and Americans. Thus ideas of scientists—in this case social sci-
entists—were the products of cultural notions.18 
Such an approach offers certain advantages to the American Studies 
scholar. It makes the study of science, medicine, and technology in 
American culture accessible to scholars trained in the humanities and 
social sciences. Naturally the American Studies scholar must learn the 
technical discourse of the science to be investigated. The principle of 
scholarship remains the same for all fields: one must understand the ac-
tivity under scrutiny. Those who have studied literature, whether poetry or 
prose, or art, or drama or cultural communities, will find that the study of, 
say, Darwinian concepts, is inherently no more difficult than any other 
subject that they have mastered in its technical aspects. Also this approach 
enables the scholar to avoid the dangers of presentism, of placing human 
action and belief in the wrong era or historical period. It will, in short, 
facilitate historicization, which will in turn permit work that is truly schol-
arly. 
The essays in this special issue do exemplify the method—the impact 
of culture and society upon science approach—outlined above that appears 
so promising and illuminating. Thus the first two papers clearly underline 
and exemplify dominant cultural notions of the early nineteenth century. 
According to Robert E. Schofield, Charles Willson Peale's museum was 
first and foremost a commercial enterprise. And indeed from the outset this 
focus was crucial to the institution's operations and development. Yet 
parallel to that was the concern for what Schofield calls Peale's commit-
ment to Enlightened Republicanism, another recognizable cultural construct 
of the era. Peale organized his museum according to the dictates of con-
temporary science, which in turn was informed by his commitment to 
republicanism. And he believed that science should be for everyone—a 
truly democratic notion. When Peale's son, Reubens, succeeded his father, 
he attempted to make it into popular entertainment, thus to make it 
commercially successful, in the absence of aristocratic or mercantile pa-
tronage, but Charles returned in the early 1820s and it survived until the 
1840s when it collapsed, literally an anachronism, an institution not suited 
for the new age in which it found itself. Schofield also argues that Peale's 
notion of science for everyone, or his commitment to individualism— 
Enlightened Republicanism to the core—became increasingly irrelevant in 
the 1830s, and American society and culture shifted from individualistic 
republicanism to mass democracy. Schofield also insists that Peale's con-
tribution was nevertheless the foundation of different scientific accomplish-
ments in new ages to come. 
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In the only essay in the history of technology, Gail Fowler Mohanty 
discusses the relationships of technology on the one hand, and society and 
culture on the other. She probes a new labor system—outwork—in the 
early nineteenth century by looking at certain aspects of the textile industry 
in Rhode Island. The early nineteenth century did not, she insists, create 
the generalized social practice of outwork. That social institution, as a gen-
eralized and ahistorical construct, could be traced back to fourteenth-cen-
tury England. But it is entirely clear from Mohanty's account that a social 
construct such as outwork, or putting out, meant one thing in one age, and 
something completely different in another. By 1810 many rural communi-
ties in Rhode Island were threatened with economic stagnation or worse, 
saddled as they were with barter economies, population increases, and 
dysfunctional inheritance patterns. Outwork became attractive to many 
women as a source of cash, which offered families opportunities for the 
accumulation of property and for greater consumption of goods. Traditional 
expectations about women's roles in society shaped the system of outwork, 
save that two notions generic to the age—cash, not goods, as remunera-
tion, and individualism as a modest dilution of traditional notions of 
female social roles—helped alter work practices. Technological innovation 
led to male artisans operating highly complex machinery to manufacture 
more elaborate fabrics while outwork made it possible for women to make 
the simpler fabrics. Outwork attracted women because it was congruent 
with societal expectations about women. Women realized that they could 
do outwork and support themselves when they had children at home; the 
kind of weaving done was neither dangerous nor particularly strenuous; 
and there was a relatively low level of skill necessary to be successful. 
Thus, Mohanty concludes, once women did outwork or piecework, "putting 
out might be viewed as one of the first efforts to incorporate women into 
the general labor force." 
The next group of papers treat, in varying ways, the later nineteenth 
century. By then the "Republican" emphasis on the individual had faded. 
Now notions of the national population assumed a hierarchy of groups, 
each distinct from the other. It was hardly surprising that Americans 
thought of themselves as members of and participants in particular groups 
in society and culture, whether white or nonwhite, Protestant or not, native 
or foreign born, rich or poor, male or female and the like. Ultimately the 
hierarchical notions of the later nineteenth century constituted statements of 
the quality of each group's ability to fit into a white, Anglo-Saxon Prot-
estant culture—each group's "American-ness", as it were. 
In her discussion of puerperal insanity, Nancy Theriot shows how a 
multifacted and interdisciplinary interpretation of a phenomenon such as 
this "disease" is a study of relationships involving, from different points of 
view, group identity—for the woman so afflicted, the constraints of 
womanhood in the larger society; for the doctor, the illness a manifestation 
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of a category of patients and categories of professional expertise for the 
doctors; and for the woman's family, the identity of patient, physician and 
medical establishment, and family itself. As Theriot puts it, puerperal 
insanity can be regarded as a socially and culturally constructed disease, 
reflecting both the gender constraints and the professional battles accompa-
nying medical specialization. She notes that discussions of the affliction in 
the last half of the nineteenth century shifted from a relative "soft" atti-
tudinal phenomenon to a "hard," seemingly biologically-caused behaviorial 
malady after the 1870s, and that after 1900 discussions of the disease 
evaporated from the medical literature, reflecting, perhaps, new notions and 
patterns of behavior concerning the possibilities for enhanced freedom for 
American women. Also twentieth-century medicine was less tolerant of 
such categories as puerperal insanity. Hence the disease was the product of 
certain cultural notions in a particular time or age. 
Group identity and hierarchical relationships were also fundamental 
cultural constructs for two other authors in this issue, Alan I Marcus and 
Zane L. Miller. As Marcus points out, hookworm was a disease that seems 
to have had an existence out of time as well as within distinct time 
periods. But central to its identification and definition for late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century Americans, including American doctors and 
physicians, was the concept of American nationality. Marcus follows 
through the often tortured debates among American doctors as to the 
causes and character of the disease among American Southerners from the 
1890s to the formation of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in 1909, 
which was inaugurated to "stamp out" the problem. Marcus insists that 
little changed in any fundamental way in these notions concerning hook-
worm. Specific ideas changed, to be sure, but the overall substance re-
mained the same, for to those interests that were concerned with the 
phenomenon, the disease of hookworm and its Southern victims retained 
their essentially alien, non-American character and thus persisted as a 
problem in the extension of American nationality. Before 1900 doctors 
blamed hookworm on immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. In the 
early 1900s they linked the disease to other groups, such as inhabitants of 
the Tropics, then to Indians and Blacks. Finally urban doctors pinpointed 
defective Southern country life as either the cause or the effect of hook-
worm. "This mode of living . . . seemed as foreign to and out of concert 
with the American nation as any of the other determinations," Marcus con-
cludes, thus evoking tremendous concern and leading to such efforts as the 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission to make the South more "American" and 
less "alien." Here Marcus finds important linkages between so-called 
progressivism in public health and the group thinking that was so charac-
teristic of the age. 
Much the same can be said about Zane L. Miller's essay on that most 
formidable intellectual opponent of racial bigotry, the social scientist W. E. 
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B. Du Bois, who, Miller argues, thought in group or racial categories just 
as his opponents in the racial conflicts of early twentieth-century America 
did. Du Bois thought of history as social process in which various races, 
each with their own distinctive geniuses, struggled for existence and pros-
perity in history. In what was perhaps the most arresting comparison Du 
Bois made, he argued that if American Blacks were given a fair chance, 
they would improve dramatically in the urban, industrial, capitalist present 
just as the ordinary whites had benefitted from the frontier experience of 
the nineteenth-century. For Du Bois as for other social scientists of the 
early 1900s, Miller argues, "culture stemmed from race," although place as 
physical and social environment was crucial in Du Bois' arguments. For 
Du Bois, race was an exciting concept. By it he meant biological as well 
as social inheritance—a common enough conception for that time. 
In the issue's concluding essay, Patricia Spain Ward addresses the 
historical background to a timely issue, the cost and accessibility of health 
care. The historical phenomenon about which she writes was set in an age 
different than those about which Theriot, Marcus and Miller have written. 
It is a staple of New Deal historiography that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt worked from a framework in which the federal government was 
a broker state, mediating among the various competing interests and enti-
ties in public life, each distinct yet interrelated to all others, in a whole 
that was greater than or different than the sum of the parts. What may not 
be so readily apprehended is that this tacit cultural notion that the whole 
was greater than or different from the sum of the parts was pervasive in 
American culture and society from the 1920s to the 1950s.19 
Ward forcefully argues that on some ultimate moral level the conflict 
about which she writes concerned whether medical care should be distrib-
uted according to need or ability to pay. Her work also clearly underlines 
the conflict between the "reformers," who wished to redesign health care 
according to the organizational blueprint of their age, and organized 
medicine, many of whose champions insisted on the older individual 
doctor and fee-for-service tradition. In that sense it is squarely within the 
cultural notions school that is so promising in the field. In 1938, the 
United States Department of Justice filed an anti-trust suit against the 
American Medical Association and certain other medical organizations. In 
1943, the Supreme Court found for the government, and levied as a fine 
the not too princely sum of $2500 against the American Medical Associa-
tion for anti-trust activity. 
As Ward's account makes clear, first officials of the Hoover Admini-
stration took up the issue, and then the New Deal carried it along—bipar-
tisanship indeed. Her account also shows that in both administrations there 
was agreement on the fundamental arrangement or order of health care as 
an organized system or network, and further demonstrates that the new 
arrangement was congruent with the basic cultural notions of the age. It 
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would have alliances of doctors, nurses, dentists and other health care 
workers, groups in larger wholes in comprehensive community medical 
centers, organized regionally in hospitals and reimbursed by various kinds 
of group payments. Just as other New Deal programs were based on 
notions of interaction and multiple purposes, such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, so was this plan. As Ward stresses, the alignment of forces was 
not favorable for this particular proposal, and the end result of the anti-
trust case was not to clear the way for a variety of "illuminating experi-
ments," as Justice Department officials had intended, but to block the 
possibilities of national health planning. But then something so uniform, if 
not monochromatic, as national health planning—certainly much more so 
than the TVA or other New Deal nostrums—might simply have not made 
sense then in the way it appears to in our own time. 
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